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COMMENTS
that if insurers are allowed subrogation by operation of law to
its insureds' collateral causes of action they will be receiving
premiums without furnishing a quid pro quo, its obvious fallacy
is that in many instances the remedy will be hollow and in others
the prosecution of the cause will be costly even if successful.
Finally, should the courts of Louisiana deny subrogation by
operation of law to insurers, the simple cause of action for reim-
bursement, based on Article 2134 of the Civil Code, is logically
undeniable to insurers, who, in distributing proceeds under
casualty policies, effectively discharge to the extent of payment
obligations for which others were liable.
There is unfortunately no better indication of the future
course of Louisiana jurisprudence than a review of the decisions
already rendered. Such a review has revealed that the problem
of recourse for insurers who have paid has proved sufficiently
troublesome to produce a confusing collection of cases. It has
been submitted that many of these cases are unsound in theory
as well as in result, and that the doctrine of subrogation by
operation of law offers a solution which is not only workable
but is also on solid ground theoretically. There appears to be
a growing disapproval of the tort remedy. As this route was
the only fairly sure way to recovery open to the insurer, possibly
this awareness of its several shortcomings augurs favorably for
the adoption of the suggested approach.
George M. Snellings III
The Louisiana Direct Action Statute
This Comment presents a review and discussion of the Lou-
isiana Direct Action Statute as it relates to modern automobile
liability insurance. The statute will be considered as a measure
designed to afford financial protection both to individuals and to
the public at large in the assertion of claims arising out of auto-
mobile accident cases. Primary emphasis will be placed upon the
manner in which the statute implements this purpose by provid-
ing ready procedural access to the insurer.
Utility to Injured Party
(1) The purpose of the Direct Action Statute. Automobile
liability insurance contracts commonly contain "no action"
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clauses providing that "no action shall lie against the company
... until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have
been determined either by judgment or settlement against the
insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured,
the claimant and the company," or to like effect.' The Louisiana
Direct Action Statute overcomes the effect of such policy pro-
visions by providing that an injured person shall have a right of
action directly against the insurer piior to determination of the
amount of the insured's obligation to pay.2 Thus, what might be
1. Louisiana's Direct Action Statute, as presently written, represents the
culmination of a long developmental process which began with the passage of
Act 253 of 1918. The 1918 act was designed solely to overcome in part the
effect of "no action" clauses, as a result of which insurers had been able to
avoid liability where the insured became insolvent or bankrupt before an injured
party could obtain or enforce judgment against him. It was to avoid this result
that the 1918 act provided, in essence, that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the
insured would not release the insurer from liability, but rather would give the
injured party a right of direct action against the insurer. By Act 55 of 1930,
the scope of the 1918 act was significantly broadened to provide an injured
party an action directly against the insurer "within the terms and limits of the
policy"; this phrase was interpreted not to allow an insurer to insert policy
terms which would deny an injured party the right of direct action given him
by the statute. Rambin v. Southern Sales Co., 145 So. 46 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1932).
With the adoption of the Insurance Code of 1948, the Direct Action Statute
became Section 14.45 thereof, and in 1950, enactment of the Revised Statutes
found the statute given its present designation as Section 655 of Title 22. In
1950 important amendments to R.S. 22:655 were adopted, with the passage of
Acts 541 and 542. Further amendment of the statute occurred by Act 475 of 1956,
with the addition of a second paragraph explaining the intent and purpose of the
section, and with a revision of the first paragraph, which was further revised
by Act 125 of 1958, the last amendment to the section.
2. The full text of the Direct Action Statute is as follows:
"No policy or contract of liability insurance shall be issued or delivered in this
state, unless it contains provisions to the effect that the insolvency or bank-
ruptcy of the insured shall not release the insurer from the payment of damages
for injuries sustained or loss occasioned during the existence of the policy, and
any judgment which may be rendered against the insured for which the insurer
is liable which shall have become executory, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
of the insolvency of the insured, and an action against the insurer may there-
after be maintained within the terms and limits of the policy by the injured
person, or his or her survivors or heirs mentioned in Revised Civil Code Article
2315. The injured person or his or her survivors or heirs hereinabove referred
to at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within
the terms and limits of the policy in the parish where the accident or injury
occurred or in the parish where the insured or insurer is domiciled, and said
action may be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and
insurer jointly and in solido, at the domicile of either of their principal place of
business in Louisiana. This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy
of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the state of Louisiana or not
and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action,
provided the accident or injury occurred within the state of Louisiana. Nothing
contained in this Section shall be construed to affect the provisions of the policy
or contract if the same are not in violation of the laws of this state. It is the
intent of this Section that any action brought hereunder shall be subject to
all of the lawful conditions of the policy or contract and the defenses which could
be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by the insured, provided the
terms and conditions of such policy or contracts are not in violation of the laws
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a policy of indemnity against loss to the insured, were the "no
action" clause enforced, is converted, by the statute's operation,
into a true policy of insurance against liability.
While most states have adopted remedial statutes, in one
form or another, allowing suit by an injured party against an
insurer, they generally allow such suits only after a determina-
tion of the insured's liability.3 This requirement that an in-
sured's liability be fixed before recourse can be had against his
insurer probably stems from an apprehension that to allow a
suit against the insurer prior to such time would result in in-
flated jury verdicts, with juries influenced more by the insurer's
solvency than by the insured's liability.4 The reason behind such
an assumption would seem to be fast disappearing in view of the
prevalence of automobile liability insurance today. In fact, it
seems probable that juries would assume that a defendant is in-
sured if not told otherwise.
5
Louisiana's Direct Action Statute, then, is unique in the ex-
tent to which it provides recourse by injured parties against
insurers." As a result, automobile liability insurance in Louisi-
ana tends to protect the public at large by providing a fund
of this state.
It is also the intent of this Section that all liability policies within their
terms and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons, his or her
survivors or heirs, to whom the insured is liable; and that it is the purpose of
all liability policies to give protection and coverage to all insureds, whether
they are named insureds or additionals insureds under the omnibus clause, for
any legal liability said insured may have as or for a tort feasor within the
terms and limits of said policy. Amended and reenacted Acts 1958, No. 125."
3. VANCE, INSURANCE 803-04, 1 135 (3d ed. 1951) ; Leigh, Direct Actions
Against Liability Insurers, 1949 INS. L.J. 633, 637.
4. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 765-71, § 13.4 (1956) ; James, Accident
Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YAIE L.J. 549
(1948) ; James & Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15
LAw & CoNTEmp. PROE. 431 (1950).
5. Some states bar mention of the fact of insurance before juries, violation
of which rule might be reversible error. New York is one such state. See
Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 4 N.Y.2d 488, 176 N.Y.S.2d 329, 151 N.E.2d 881
(1958) ; Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 157, 273 (1955).
6. In most states, the right of an injured party to recover on an automobile
liability policy is determined solely by reference to the terms of the policy itself.
See VANCE, INSURANCE 800-06, § 135 (3d ed. 1951). Wisconsin is the only other
state which has gone so far as to allow direct actions against insurers before
determination of tortfeasors' liability. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 85.93, 260.11 (1951).
The statement has been made: "The Louisiana statute seems to have paved the
way for a real liberalization of the old immunities. Edwards v. Royal Ind. Co.,
182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) ; Lusk v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App. 1941). The Wisconsin statute has not. Lasecki v.
Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940) ; Fehr v. General Accident Fire &
Life Assurance Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944)." James & Thornton
The Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAw & CONTEmp. PROR. 431,
437, n. 28 (1950).
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which can be reached by an injured party, rather than being
available only to the insured as a barrier against his actual loss. 7
It is submitted that the following are advantages which result
from allowing suit against an insurer prior to determination of
the insured's liability. First, from a purely procedural point of
view, provision for direct actions eliminates circuity in the set-
tlement of claims in that a determination of both the insured's
and the insurer's liability is made in the same proceeding. Sec-
ond, allowing suit directly against an insurer permits a realistic
conception of the role played by liability insurance, thus further-
ing the public policy of providing protection for those injured in
automobile accidents by permitting the fact of insurance to be
considered by the courts and juries.
(2) Defenses against the direct action. Since an insurer is
subject to a direct suit by an injured party, it becomes impor-
tant to determine to what extent the defenses which would be
available to the insured against the plaintiff will be available to
the insurer. It is a well-established rule that, in a direct action
against an insurer, only the general defenses of the insured can
be urged by the insurer." Thus, an insurer cannot successfully
rely upon any defense which is purely personal to the insured.9
One example of this is found in cases denying to an insurer the
right to rely upon the defense of interspousal immunity in an
action by a spouse against the other spouse's insurer. 10 Nor may
an insurer assert the defense of sovereign immunity available to
governmental units or their agencies. This has been held to be a
defense personal to the governmental unit or agency, so that it
will not avail the insurer.1 Similarly, the defense of charitable
immunity is not available to an insurer in a direct action. 12 On
7. See Leigh, Direct Actions Against Liability Insurers, 1949 INS. L.J.
633, 680.
8. McDowell v. National Sur. Corp., 68 So.2d 189 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953),
appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 995 (1954).
9. Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935) ; Edwards v. Royal
Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) ; Harvey v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co., 6 So.2d 774 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942).
10. Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935)
Harvey v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 6 So.2d 774 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942).
Similarly, a suit by a wife against her husband's employer's liability insurer for
injuries sustained by her through his negligent operation of an automobile while
in the scope of his employment has been held maintainable as against the
insurer's plea of the defense of interspousal immunity. LeBlanc v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 202 La. 857, 13 So.2d 245 (1943).
11. Brooks v. Bass, 184 So. 222- (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938) ; Rome v. London
& Lancashire Indemnity Co., 169 So. 132 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936).
12. Lusk v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1941).
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the other hand, the insurer may assert such general defenses as
contributory negligence13 and prescription.14
The Direct Action Statute provides that "an action against
the insurer may ... be maintained within the terms and limits
of the policy."'15 (Emphasis added.) It is thus important to de-
termine the legal effects of a failure by the insured to comply
with certain conditions found generally in automobile liability in-
surance policies. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in West v. Mon-
roe Bakery,6 held that the insured's failure to comply with a
policy requirement that the insurer be given notice of an acci-
dent "as soon as practicable"' 17 would not prevent recovery by
the injured party under the Direct Action Statute. The court
reasoned that the right of direct action conferred on an injured
third party by the statute vests in him immediately upon the oc-
currence of an accident, and is not contingent upon any stipula-
tion between the insurer and the insured, contained in the policy
contract. The court cited with favor an earlier decision' 8 in which
a notice clause had been interpreted as relating only to cases
where the insured has paid a damage claim and seeks to be re-
imbursed by his insurer. The court in West relied upon the same
case as to the meaning of the provision in the statute granting
a direct action "within the terms and limits of the policy,"' 9
holding that it was not intended to include the requirement of
notice, but referred only to the amount which might be recovered
and to those other warranties and conditions with which it was
within the power of the injured party to comply. As to the pos-
sibility that such an interpretation might work a hardship upon
an insurer, the court stated that the insurer's obvious relief was
through legislative action. Further, the benefit of the doubt
should be given the innocent injured party as against the in-
surer, who has entered into the contract with full knowledge of
the statute and for a monetary consideration. The court did,
however, expressly recognize the possibility of an action over
13. See Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 169 So. 132 (La. App.
Or]. Cir. 1936).
14. See Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So.2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
15. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), amended and re-enacted, La.Acts 1958, No. 125.
16. 217 La. 189, 46 So.2d 122 (1950).
17. 217 La. 189, 202, 46 So.2d 122, 127 (1950). The disputed policy provi-
'sion read in full: "When an accident occurs written notice shall be given by
or on behalf of the insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as
soon as practicable."
18. Edwards v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., l'La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (Orl.
-Cir. 1929).
19. La. Acts 1930, No. 55, amended and re-enacted,' La. 'Acts 1958, No. 125.
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against the insured by the insurer, for breach of policy pro-
visions. 20
The holding of the West decision, that the rights of an in-
jured third party to maintain a direct action become fixed at
the time of an accident, would seem sufficiently broad to elimi-
nate, as a defense to the insurer, the insured's failure to comply
with any policy provision subsequent to the occurrence of an
accident. 21 Thus, it would appear that non-cooperation of the
insured would be no defense against an injured third party's
direct action, despite the fact that virtually all automobile liabil-
ity policies require that the insured assist the insurer in the de-
fense of any action covered by the policy.22 A like result should
obtain in the event that the insured ceases to pay policy pre-
miums after the occurrence of an accident, though in violation
of policy provisions.
In Section 900 of the Louisiana Safety Responsibility Law,"
it is provided in part:
"F. Every motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject to
the following provisions which need not be contained therein:
(1) The liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the
insurance required by this Chapter shall become absolute
whenever injury or damage covered by said motor vehicle
liability policy occurs; said policy may not be cancelled or
annulled as to such liability by an agreement between the in-
surance carrier and the insured after the occurrence of the
injury or damage; no statement made by the insured or on
his behalf and no violation of said policy shall defeat or void
said policy .... H. Any motor vehicle liability policy may
provide that the insured shall reimburse the insurance car-
rier for any payment the insurance carrier would not have
been obligated to make under the terms of the policy except
for the provisions of this Chapter."
The insurance policy with which the court was concerned in
20. 217 La. 189, 202, 46 So.2d 122, 127 (1950) : "It would seem that the
rule of common sense is that this is a matter entirely between the assured and
Its insurer, and that the insurer has a cause of action for the contract breaching
against the insured."
21. For a case involving an admission of liability by the insured, in violation
of policy provisions, see U-Drive-It Car Co. v. Freidman, 153 So. 500 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1934).
22. See American Fire & Cam. Co. v. Gresham, 195 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1952).
23. LA. R.S. 32:851-1043 (Supp. 1960), enacted La. Acts 1952, No. 52, 141.R.S. 32:900 defines with particularity a "Motor Vehicle Liability Policy."
[Vol. XXII
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West was an ordinary automobile liability policy, as distin-
guished from a "motor vehicle liability policy," the latter being
a policy certified in accordance with the requirements of the
Safety Responsibility Law as proof of financial responsibility
against liability arising out of future automobile accidents. A
person may be required to prove such financial responsibility for
the future when he fails to satisfy a judgment arising out of a
prior accident. 24 The clear purpose of this requirement is to pro-
vide effective recourse against such person to those who may
sustain damage or injury as a result of his negligence in future
accidents. The above-quoted language of the Safety Responsibil-
ity Law would seem to adopt the rule of the West decision, as to
"motor vehicle liability policies," insofar as it denies to insurers
the power to avoid liability to injured persons by reason of a
breach of policy provisions by the insured subsequent to the oc-
currence of an accident. A further question, however, is whether
these provisions might not deny the insurer the power to avoid
liability under a "motor vehicle liability policy" even if its in-
sured breached a condition of the policy before the occurrence
of the accident out of which an injured party's claim arose.
While no cases were found on this point, it is arguable that an
insurer should not escape liability in such a situation unless it
has taken proper steps to have the "motor vehicle liability pol-
icy" rescinded by reason of the breach.
Instances in Which a Direct Action Is Available
(1) Accident must occur in Louisiana. The Direct Action
Statute provides that "This right of direct action shall exist
whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written or deliv-
ered in the state of Louisiana and whether or not such policy
contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the
accident or injury occurred within the state of Louisiana.' 25 Al-
though the above-quoted provision was not contained in the stat-
ute until added by a 1950 amendment,26 the Louisiana Supreme
Court had earlier ruled that no direct action was maintainable
on an accident which had occurred in Mississippi.27 In that de-
cision, the court stated that the statute was procedural rather
24. Id. 82:892.
25. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), amended and re-enacted, La. Acts 1958, No. 125.
26. La. Acts 1950, No. 541.
27. Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So.2d 875
(1946).
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than substantive, 28 viewing it as affecting the injured party's
means of recovery rather than right to recover. On this basis,
the court concluded that the statute could give the injured party
no more rights than she had under Mississippi law; and since
that state did not give plaintiff wife a cause of action against
her husband, no action could be maintained in Louisiana courts
directly against the husband's insurer.
(2) Locus of the Insurance Contract. (a) Louisiana con-
tracts. Under the provisions of the Louisiana Insurance Code,2 9
a foreign or alien liability insurer must, as a condition precedent
to doing business in Louisiana, consent to be sued in a direct
action "whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written
or delivered in the state of Louisiana or not." Even prior to the
enactment of this provision, the Direct Action Statute had been
upheld when applied to insurance contracts issued or delivered
within the state, by virtue of the provisions of the statute it-
self . 0 Greater difficulty, however, has been encountered in the
application of the statute to out-of-state contracts.
(b) Out-of-state contracts. In Robbins v. Short,31 a Louisi-
ana court of appeal allowed a direct action where the accident
had occurred in Louisiana, even though the policy was written
in Missouri and contained a "no action" clause. The court's view
was that the statute was merely remedial and procedural, and
therefore that to allow the suit deprived the insurer of no sub-
stantial right under the Missouri contract. Subsequently, how-
ever, grave questions concerning the constitutionality of apply-
ing the statute to out-of-state insurance contracts were raised in
the federal courts. 2 It was left to the United States Supreme
28. Cfj. Vowell v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 229 La. 798, 86 So.2d 909
(1956).
29. LA. R.S. 22:983 (1950), amended and re-enacted, La. Acts 1958, No. 125.
30. Gager v. Teche Transfer Co., 143 So. 62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932);
Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co., 18 La. App.
725, 138 So. 183 (Orl. Cir. 1932).
31. 165 So. 512 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).
32. Shortly following the incorporation of the Direct Action Statute into
Louisiana's Insurance Code of 1948, as Section 14.45, serious questions concern-
ing the applicability of the statute to out-of-state insurance contracts were raised
in Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co., 89 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. La.
1950), in which it was held that the legislature did not intend the statute to
apply to out-of-state contracts. The court also stated that it would be uncon-
stitutional to apply the statute to such out-of-state contracts if they contained
"no action" clauses valid in the state in which the contract was written. Acts
541 and 542 of 1950 appear to have been intended to accomplish a legislative
overruling of the Belanger decision. Act 541 amended the Direct Action Statute
4o as to provide that a right of direct action-exists whether or not the insurance
policy was written or delivered in Louisiana, and regardless of whether or not
[Vol. XXII
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Court, in Watson v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.,33 to
resolve the questions by sustaining the application of the statute
to out-of-state contracts where the accidents occur in Louisiana.
The Court in Watson rejected contentions that application of the
statute to an out-of-state policy was violative of the equal pro-
tection, 34 due process, 5 contract, 6 and full faith and credit3 7
clauses of the United States Constitution.
Procedural Considerations
(1) Is the Direct Action Statute procedural or substantive?
(a) State courts. In West v. Monroe Bakery,38 the Louisiana
Supreme Court characterized the Direct Action Statute as being
the policy's provisions forbid a direct action against the insurer, provided the
accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana. Act 542 was passed
to avoid the objection raised in the Belanger decision that the application of
the Direct Action Statute in a case involving an out-of-state policy containing
a "no action" clause would constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of property
without due process of law. That act amended the statute so as to require that
foreign or alien insurers consent to be sued directly by an injured party as a
condition precedent to doing business in the state. In Bouis v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 91 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. La. 1950), Act 541 was given retrospective
effect in the application of the Direct Action Statute to an out-of-state insurance
contract which contained a "no action" clause. By characterizing Acts 541 and
542 as remedial and procedural, the court justified their retrospective application
to the policy in question. Bayard v. Traders and General Ins. Co., 104 F.
Supp. 7 (W.D. La. 1952), however, specifically held the Direct Action Statute
to be substantive, with the result that it could not constitutionally be applied
to an out-of-state insurance policy. The court stated that the consent to be
sued filed by the defendant insurance company "was exacted as a condition
to the defendant's doing business in the state, and to that extent was coerced
and should be strictly construed as in derogation of a common right." Id. at 7.
33. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
34. As to the contention that the Direct Action Statute constituted a denial
of equal protection, the Court answered: "The State's direct action provisions
fall with equal force upon all liability insurance companies, foreign and domestic.
Employers point to no other provisions of the Louisiana law or to facts of
any nature which give the slightest support to any charge of discriminatory
application of the direct action statute." 348 U.S. 66, 70 (1954).
35. The Court concluded that the Direct Action Statute did not violate due
process, in light of "Louisiana's legitimate interest in safeguarding the rights
of persons injured there." 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954). Neither did Louisiana's
compelling foreign insurers to consent to direct actions violate due process;
"Louisiana has a constitutional right to subject foreign liability insurance
companies to the direct action provisions of its laws whether they consent or
not." Id. at 74.
36. Id. at 70: "[S]ince the direct action provisions became effective before this
insurance contract was made, there is a similar lack of substantiality in the
suggestion that Louisiana has violated Art. I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution which forbids states to impair the obligation of contracts."
37. Id. at 73: The Court stated that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
"does not automatically compel a state to subordinate its own contract laws to
the laws of another state in which a contract happens to have been executed.
Where, as here, a contract affects the people of several states, each may have
interests that leave it free to enforce its own contract policies."
38. 217 La. 189, 46 So.2d 122 (1950).
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substantive in the sense that substantive rights to proceed di-
rectly against an insurer vest immediately upon the occurrence
of an accident. The question involved in that case, however, re-
lated to the failure of the insured to give timely notice to the
insurer that an accident had occurred. Thus, it might be argued
that the question whether the Louisiana courts will treat the
statute as substantive for other purposes, such as whether or
not it can be applied to accidents occurring in other states, or to
insurance contracts written and delivered in other states, was
not touched upon in West.39 These latter questions, however,
have been dealt with by the specific language of the statute.40
Applicability of the Direct Action Statute to actions brought
in other states on accidents which occurred in Louisiana has
been considered in the courts of Texas and New York. In a re-
cent Texas Supreme Court decision,41 the statute was construed
as being procedural "in so far as it provides for joinder of a
liability or indemnity insurance company with the insured in
tort cases. ' '42 The court stated that it was compelled to reach
that conclusion because the Texas Supreme Court rules treat the
subject matter of joinder of parties as procedural, and further,
because the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit the joinder
in tort cases of a liability insurer, in the absence of specific
authorization by Texas statute. The New York Court of Appeals
reached the same result,43 but based its determination solely
upon the provision of the Direct Action Statute authorizing a
direct action "in the parish where the accident or injury oc-
curred or in the parish where the insured has his domicile,"''
concluding that this language restricted the bringing of direct
39. In Vowell v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co., 229 La. 798, 812,
86 So.2d 909, 914 (1956), the court said that the Direct Action Statute is
"purely remedial and does not affect substantial rights under the insurance
contract nor impair its obligations." In Home Insurance Co. v. Highway
Insurance Underwriters, 222 La. 540, 62 So.2d 828 (1952), the court held that
the statute is remedial in that it avoids the necessity for recovery from an
insured and then subsequently from an insurer. See Robbins v. Short, 165 So.
512 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) ; Lowery v. Zorn, 157 So. 826 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1934) ; Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co., 18
La. App. 725, 138 So. 183 (Orl. Cir. 1932).
40. LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1960) : "This right of direct action shall exist
whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the state
of Louisiana or not and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbid-
ding such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred within the state
of Louisiana."
41. Penny v. Powell, 347 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1961).
42. Id. at 603.
43. Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 4 N.Y.2d 488, 176 N.Y.S.2d 329, 151
N.E.2d 881 (1958).
44. LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1960).
252 [Vol. XXII
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actions against the insurer to the appropriate Louisiana parishes
only. The court observed that the lower court had also consid-
ered the fact that a direct action opposes New York's public pol-
icy of eliminating the fact of insurance from the jury's consid-
eration, but emphasized that this consideration played no part
in its determination. 45
(b) Federal courts. In Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Elbert,4 the United States Supreme Court sustained the diver-
sity jurisdiction of a United States District Court sitting in Lou-
isiana over a plaintiff and a defendant insurer of diverse resi-
dences, despite the fact that the plaintiff and the insured were
both Louisiana residents. The Court, in reaching its conclusion
that defendant insurer, an Illinois corporation, was the "real
party at interest, ' 47 followed the lead taken by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, which had "characterized the statute as creating
a separate and distinct cause of action against the insurer. '48 To
defendant's contention that the tortfeasor was an indispensable
party to the litigation, whose presence would destroy diversity
of citizenship, the Court replied that "the state has created an
optional right to proceed directly against the insurer; by bring-
ing the action against petitioner [the insurer], respondent has
apparently abandoned her action against the tortfeasor.114  Fi-
45. Federal courts in both Texas and New York had previously reached re-
sults contrary to those reached by the state courts. Chambless v. National
Industrial Laundries, 149 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Tex. 1957); Collins v. American
Automobile Insurance Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956).
46. 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
47. Id. at 51.
48. Ibid.
49. Id. at 52. The statement that "by bringing the action against petitioner
[the insurer], respondent has apparently abandoned her action against the
tortfeasor" seems open to question. Although an extended discussion of the
point is beyond the. scope of this Comment, it has been indicated that to obtain
judgment against the insured alone will not result in an abandonment of the
injured party's rights against the insurer. In Sewell v. Newton, 152 So. 389
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934), a defendant obtained judgment in reconvention against
an insured. The court said: "[Defendant] needs no reservation of its rights
against the insurance carrier of [plaintiff]. Under the statute referred to
[the Direct Action Statute], its right is to proceed directly against either the
principal or the insurer, or both, and to seek solidary judgments. So long as the
claim is not paid by one [either the insured or the insurer], the right to sue the
other exists." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 393.
On the other hand, it has been indicated that dismissal on the merits of an
injured party's direct action against an insurer will bar a subsequent action against
the insured. In Emmeo Insurance Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 237 La. 286, 290, 111
So.2d 115, 117 (1959), the court said in dictum: "[O]n a dismissal of the
suit of plaintiff against the insurer alone, following a finding that he was solely
responsible for the accident, unquestionably he would be barred from instituting
an action against the insured."
It appears that three problems must be distinguished: (1) Will merely
obtaining a judgment against either the insured or the insurer alone, without
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nally, the Court refused to decline, as a matter of discretion, to
exercise its jurisdiction over suits against an insurer alone. De-
fendant had urged that the federal courts should do so upon the
basis that Louisiana civil cases are normally tried without a
jury. The Court held that the case fell squarely within the lan-
guage of the congressional grant of jurisdiction to the lower fed-
eral courts. Thus, as a result of the decision in Elbert, it is set-
tled that an injured Louisiana resident will have access to the
federal courts sitting in Louisiana against an out-of-state in-
surer, regardless of the fact that the tortfeasor may himself be
a Louisiana resident. This being so, it is submitted that, al-
though the Court did not deal specifically with the question, the
Elbert decision must necessarily be read as having characterized
the Direct Action Statute as being "substantive" rather than
"procedural" for purposes of characterization under Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins.5 0
(2) Third party practice under the direct action statute.
(a) In Louisiana courts. Article 1111 of the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure allows the defendant in a principal action to
call in any person, including a co-defendant, "who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the principal demand." By this
means, a defendant insurer may call its insured, the alleged tort-
feasor, into a direct action, but only by asserting that the insured
is or may be liable to it for all or part of the principal demand.
This being so, the availability of this aspect of third party prac-
tice to insurers is severely limited. It would appear that an in-
surer will be allowed to call in its insured as a third party de-
fendant only in situations such as those involving a breach of the
policy provisions by the insured, which might give rise to an
action against the insured. Even so, however, Article 1111 is
useful in that the insurer having a claim against its insured is
not required to assert it in a subsequent action.51
having satisfaction on it, bar a subsequent suit against the other? (2) Will
both obtaining and satisfying a judgment against either the insured or the
insurer alone bar a subsequent suit against the other? (3) Will dismissal on
the merits of a suit against either the insured or the insurer bar a subsequent
suit against the other?
50. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The federal courts are to apply the substantive
law of the state of the forum in all matters other than those governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress. Matters strictly procedural, on
the other hand, are governed in the federal courts by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
51. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1091 (1960) would allow an insured
to intervene in a direct action suit, originally brought against his insurer.
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(b) In federal courts. Under Rule 14 (a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a defendant may, within the discretion of the
trial judge, 52 call in as third party defendant, a person not a
party to the action,53 who is or may be liable to him for all or
part of plaintiff's claim against him. Thus, under the federal
rule, as under the Louisiana rule, an insurer desiring to call in
its insured as third party defendant would be limited by the
requirement that it assert that the insured is or may be liable to
it in whole or in part. When, however, the insured is able and
allowed to assert a third party demand against its insured in
federal court, the fact that the insured may be a resident of the
same state as the plaintiff will not destroy the court's diversity
jurisdiction; in such a situation, the court is considered as hav-
ing ancillary jurisdiction over the third party defendant. 54
In Pucheu v. National Sur. Corp.,55 defendant insurer availed
itself of the provisions of Rule 14(a) to call as third party
defendants the driver and insurer of the automobile in which
plaintiff was a passenger at the time of its collision with its
insured's automobile. This, of course, amounted to a double
direct action- one by the injured party against defendant in-
surer, and another by defendant insurer against the third party
defendant insurer of the other automobile. By this means, de-
fendant insurer was able to assert that ultimate liability should
fall elsewhere than on it, without having to institute a subse-
quent suit to do so.
(3) Subrogation of insurer to rights of insured.
The question arises whether an insurer, which has been sub-
rogated to the rights of its insured by the payment of the
insured's claim, can itself maintain a subsequent direct action
against the alleged tortfeasor's insurer, without first obtaining
judgment against the tortfeasor himself.56 The Louisiana Court
of Appeal for the Second Circuit, in World Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. American Automobile Ins. Co.,57 appears to have answered
52. Under id. art. 1111, the trial judge does not have the discretion to refuse
to allow a defendant to call in a third party.
53. Ibid. A third party defendant may be "any person, including a code-
fendant." (Emphasis added.)
54. BENDER, FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL 97-98 (1948). A minority view
is to the contrary. Federal Rule 24 sets out the federal rule as to intervention,
as by an insured whose insurer is the defendant in a direct action.
55. 87 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. La. 1949).
56. See Comment, 22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 225 (1961), dealing exten-
sively with the subject of insurer's subrogation.
57. 42 So.2d 565 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
1961]
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in the negative. The court there relied upon the language of
the Direct Action Statute that "the injured party or his or her
heirs, at their option, shall have a right of direct action against
the insurance company."58 The court reasoned that the statute,
being in derogation of a common right, must be strictly con-
strued, and that its provisions granting a right of direct ac-
tion thus cannot be extended to include any class, group, or
individual not comprehended under the definition "the injured
party or his . . . heirs." Subsequently, however, in Motors
Ins. Corp. v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp.,5 9 the First
Circuit Court of Appeal did allow a direct action by an in-
surer against an alleged tortfeasor's insurer. The court there,
while noting the result reached in the World Fire case, apparent-
ly purported to distinguish it by saying: "In the case at bar, we
are dealing with a conventional subrogation," 60 implying that the
World Fire case did not involve conventional subrogation. The
court went on to say that the subrogee was not exercising a right
by virtue of the Direct Action Statute, which gives him no such
right, but rather "by virtue of the articles of the Civil Code and
the established jurisprudence of this state which hold that he is
substituted for the subrogor in all of the latter's rights, actions
and remedies."' This language seems in direct conflict with
the decision reached in the World Fire case. If, however, the
latter decision has any vitality, it would appear that it will not
limit to any significant degree the maintenance of direct actions
by the insurer, in light of the fact that automobile liability insur-
ance policies generally do contain conventional subrogation pro-
visions.
Conclusion
Through the enactment of its Direct Action Statute, Louisi-
ana has taken a significant step in recognizing the social import-
ance of modern automobile liability insurance as a means by
which persons injured as a result of automobile accidents may
obtain financial relief for their losses. This recognition involves
a basic determination that the obligation assumed by the liability
insurer is undertaken not only to indemnify the insured against
58. La. Acts 1930, No. 55, incorporated as LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), amended
and re-enacted by La. Acts 1958, No. 125. This portion of the statute was
amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 475, to include "survivors."
59. 52 So.2d 311 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
60. Id. at 313.
61. Id. at 315. The court's decision was predicated on LA. CiVm CoDE arts.
2159 and 2160 (1870).
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losses he may actually sustain, but also to provide a fund directly
available to one injured as a result of acts of the named insured
or of additional insureds under the expanded coverage currently
afforded by liability policies. The approach taken by Louisiana
towards a solution of the problems engendered by today's wide-
spread use of automobiles, with all their potential for causing
damage, is a realistic evaluation of the role played by automobile
liability insurance. The courts have liberally construed the
provisions of the statute so as best to serve the purposes it was
designed to fulfill.
John Schwab II
Free Enterprise- Cost of Capital Rate
Determination: "Rolled In" Costs
A public utility rate proceeding is of interest to the general
public only in that the final result of it may be an increase or
decrease in the prices paid by the public for the service they
receive from that particular utility. The price paid by the con-
sumer for service, however, is fixed only after consideration
of many factors which bear both on the interest of the public
in lower rates, and the interest of the utility in maintaining a
financially sound enterprise. It would seem that a fair rate
determination should arrive at the best balance between the
interests of the consumer and the interests of the utility and its
investors. In order for a utility to be financially sound, it must
receive revenues in excess of its operating expenses that will
enable it to retire its fixed indebtedness and to pay a fair return
to its investors.1 This excess is usually expressed as a percentage
of the total capital investment of the utility, known as the com-
posite rate of return.
1. This is basically a statement of the rule announced in the case of Federal
Power Commission v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944), wherein the Court
stated: "[T]he fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates involves a balancing of the
investor and the consumer interests. . . . From the investor or company point
of view, it is important that there be enough revenues not only for operating
expenses, but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on
the debt and dividends on the stock.... By that standard the return to the equity
owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises
having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure
confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit
and to attract capital."
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